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Abstract. In this paper  we provide an account of most of  the passive labor 
market  policies (unemployment compensation, social assistance, state social 
support and the pension system) in the Czech Republic during the 1990-1996 
period. The eligibility requirements and benefit levels are described in great 
detail. Using Labor  Force Survey data, we compare the characteristics of  un- 
employed people receiving unemployment benefits with those receiving social 
assistance and those not receiving any benefits and we find significant differ- 
ences in their characteristics. Finally, we provide an analysis of  the work dis- 
incentive effects of  the unemployment and social assistance benefits by com- 
paring these benefits to market  wages and by analyzing the effect of  being in 
the system on the duration of unemployment of  two cohorts of  unemployed in 
1994 and 1995. We find that social assistance benefits are fairly generous for 
low income families with more children, individuals with these characteristics 
have a higher probability of receiving social assistance and they tend to stay 
unemployed longer than those people with relatively fewer dependants. We 
conclude that the social assistance scheme seems to be having some dis- 
incentive effects for at least one group in the population. 
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Introduction 
This study contributes to our understanding of the work incentive effects of 
the income maintenance schemes for the unemployed in the Czech Republic. 
It begins by updating the description of structure of social assistance and un- 
employment compensation presented in Terrell and Munich (1996) and pro- 
ceeds with an analysis of the characteristics and labour supply behaviour of 
the persons taking part in these schemes. We would like to know to what 
extent people on these income maintenance schemes differ from other unem- 
ployed people and whether or not people in these schemes are more likely to 
stay unemployed longer than those who are not taking part in these schemes. 
More specifically, we begin in Part I by briefly reviewing the structure 
of the various income maintenance schemes, namely unemployment benefits, 
social assistance, social support and pensions, with special emphasis on the 
changes introduced at the beginning of 1996 (Sections 1 and 2). We then take 
a look at the relative magnitudes of the benefits and their potential incentive 
effects in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe how the systems are financed. 
In Part II we proceed to analyse the characteristics of the people receiving 
unemployment benefits and social assistance. We begin in Section 5 by dis- 
cerning the magnitude of the population receiving income support of each 
type and the extent to which individuals rely on both schemes vs. just one. We 
then compare the characteristics of unemployed people supported by these 
two systems and ask to what extent do they differ. We rely on the results 
from our analysis of Labour Force Survey (LFS) quarterly data over the 1994- 
1995 period as well as the results of one other study based on a smaller more 
specific survey. In Section 6, we assess the relative impact that these two pro- 
grams have on the probability of leaving unemployment by estimating hazard 
functions with LFS data on two cohorts of unemployed individuals in two 
years (1994 and 1995). We draw conclusions and delineate the resulting un- 
answered questions in Part III. 
Part I: Passive benefit systems 1990-1996 
1. The unemployment compensation system ~ 
An unemployment compensation system (UCS) was put into effect January 1, 
1990 and it has undergone several changes since. It began as a generous one 
until reforms put into place on January 1, 1992 made the level of benefits 
(based on wage replacement rates) and eligibility criteria more restrictive. 
In January 1996, new reforms increased the replacement rates for the new 
entrants and certain other groups of unemployed and broadened again the 
eligibility criteria. 
Eligibility." Only a job seeker registered at the district Labour Office qualifies 
for unemployment benefits) In 1990-1991 basically the only additional con- 
1 This section is only a brief description based on a more detailed analysis in Terrell and Munich, 
1996. 
2 A person can qualify for unemployment and social assistance benefits only if registered, avail- 
able for work and co-operating with the office in job search activities. Those who are not imme- 
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dition was a minimum of twelve months work within the previous three years. 
This work period could be substituted with a number of different situations 
(such as care for own child until the age of three, imprisonment, registered 
unemployment, full time study and others). From January 1, 1992 to January 1, 
1996, the period of employment could only be substituted with a period of 
study. In 1996, however, the former broader eligibility criteria have been put 
back into effect. The administrative records from the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs suggest, however, no increase in the share of  the unemployed 
receiving unemployment benefits as one would expect after broadening of the 
eligibility rules. By the end of the second quarter of 1995 this share was 43.4% 
and by the end of 1995 it had risen to 44.2%. However, by mid-1996 it reached 
44.4%, i.e. it has not changed significantly. 
Entitlement: Prior to January 1, 1992, the unemployed were entitled to receive 
benefits for twelve months, since then, the entitlement period has been six 
months. Periods of  sickness, maternity leave or participation in government- 
subsidised job placement programs (during which benefits are replaced by 
other sources of  income) are not deducted from the entitlement period. 
Benefits: In 1990-1991, the replacement rate varied depending on the reason 
for layoff (e.g., up to 90% for the first six months for those laid off for organi- 
sational reasons). From 1992 to the present, the replacement rates are unified 
on 60% of the previous net wage for the first three months and 50% for the 
next three months. Since 1990, those in training programs have received 70% 
of their previous net average wage while participating in the program. From 
1992 to 1995, the maximum level of benefits was set at 1.5 times the minimum 
wage (1.8 times for those in retraining). In January 1, 1996 the base for the 
maximum changed to the minimum living standard for an adult in a one 
person household. 3 There is no minimum benefit since 1992. Benefits are not 
indexed to inflation, nor are they taxed. 
Until the end of  1995 the wage base for the unemployment benefit received 
by labour force entrants was the minimum wage. As of  January 1, 1996 the 
base has been changed to the minimum living standard for an adult in a 
one person household (2,660 CZK at that time, 2,890 CZK currently). This 
change has raised the benefit in the first three months of unemployment from 
1,320 CZK in 1995 to 1,596 CZK in January 1996 and further to 1,734 CZK 
since October 1996. 
2. Social assistance system 4 
Unlike the unemployment benefits, the social assistance system was estab- 
lished before 1990. However, several legal changes and new components were 
diately available for work can also register at the district Labour Office, but in a different category 
and do not qualify for unemployment benefits. Persons who are struck from the register for non- 
co-operation cannot be re-registered for three months. 
3 The minimum living standards will be described below. 
4 In order to limit the scope of the paper, we have left out certain parts of the social assistance 
systems, such as sickness benefits (except maternity-related), the sphere of social institutions for 
the aged and disabled and old-age and invalidity pensions as these have many specific features and 
aims. 
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introduced in 1991-1994, and a new and substantially revised social 
assistance system was partially passed by the Parliament in 1995. Parts of it 
(e.g., parental benefits) came into effect in October 1995 while other parts 
(e.g., child allowances) came into effect in January, 1996. Reform of the 
remaining old schemes is still being drafted and is expected to be presented to 
the Parliament in 1997. 
The new social assistance system aims to cover a wide range of causes of 
social necessity. It is composed of three major norms: the first - Socia l  Assis-  
tance - supports those who are in a financial or social need and are unable to 
raise the income themselves or with the assistance of their family; the second - 
S ta t e  Soc ia l  Suppor t  - provides benefits for families raising children; and the 
third - Soc ia l  Insurance  - provides social security through a pension system, 
sickness and employment-injury benefits. 
2.1 Social assistance 
Law no. 23[1991 establishes the right for everyone who is in material need 
to "assistance as is essential for ensuring the basic living conditions with the 
proviso set by law." Following this, Law no. 463/1991 established the mini-  
m u m  living s tandards  (MLS). Anyone whose income is determined to fall 
below the MLS is eligible for social assistance benefits equal to the difference 
between their income (in the last six months) and the level of the MLS. (See 
the appendix for a more precise definition of how the household income is 
calculated.). A household has to re-apply for social assistance (SA) benefits 
every six months and in principle is entitled to these benefits as long as its 
income fails short of the MLS. Any unemployed member of the household 
must be registered at the district labour office in order for the household to be 
eligible for SA benefits. 
The MLS is uniform across the country despite the presence of significant 
regional differences in the cost of living. Since the cost of living is, in general, 
lower in high unemployment regions, the uniform social assistance benefits 
might thus discourage job search in particular in these low-cost districts. 5 
The levels of MLS for different categories of individuals and households 
are presented in Table 1. For each person his/her MLS is computed as a sum 
of two parts: i) the personal minimum, which is a function of age; and ii) the 
household minimum, which is a function of the number of individuals living 
together as a household. MLS for individuals with particular needs (e.g. The 
health problems) is further increased by 600 CZK per month. 
The MLS levels are indexed on a regular basis. Until 1995 they were 
changed whenever inflation (measured by the CPI) had risen by more than 
10% since the previous indexation. Since January 1995, the threshold of in- 
flation was decreased to 5% reflecting the fall of the aggregate inflation level in 
the country. According to the law, the extent of indexation should "take into 
the account the extent of the cost-of-living increase," but no exact guidance is 
provided. The size of the increase is thus fully at the discretion of the govern- 
ment. Up to now, the rate of increase of the MLS has been equal to the 
changes in the CPI index. 
s See Erbenova (1995) for some empirical evidence on the regional disparities in wages and 
unemployment  rates. 
Work incentive and other effects of social assistance and unemployment benefit policy 
Table 1. Individual and household minimum living standards (nominal, monthly CZK) 












900 1020 1120 1230 
1000 1130 1240 1360 
1200 1360 1500 1620 
1300 1470 1620 1780 
1200 1360 1500 1680 
Household minimum 
500 600 660 760 
650 780 860 1000 
800 960 1060 1240 
950 1140 1260 1400 
1996 











Note: Both the individual and the household minimum are changed by the government decree 
whenever the consumer inflation exceeded a pre-specified level since the last increase. See the text 
for more details. 
2.2 State social support 
The goal of the new social support system, 6 which came fully into effect in 
January 1996, is to make the benefit structure more consistent with the opera- 
tion of the market economy. The main objectives pursued by the government 
in reforming the scheme can be summarised as follows: 
9 change in the mechanism of benefit disbursement 
9 greater emphasis on means-tested schemes 
9 targeting of benefits primarily towards poorer families 
9 clarification and simplification of the eligibility criteria and application 
process 
9 unification of all types of the benefits paid to families with children under 
one legal norm, reduction in the number of different benefits and rationali- 
sation of their structure 
9 introduction of allowances in response to new social problems (e.g., benefits 
covering travel expenses and housing expenses) 
The need to change the system of benefit disbursement followed from the 
transformation-related increase in the number of employers. Under the previ- 
ous system, all these benefits were physically disbursed by the employers. 
6 Laws no. 11711995 and 118/1995 and their amendments. 
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As the number of employers grew from about 8,000 in 1990 to more than 
33,000 in 1995, the control and administration of this system became unman- 
ageable. Furthermore, unemployed, self-employed and employees of small 
enterprises received their benefits at the district level offices of the Social 
Assistance Administration. Hence, there were two distinct ways of disbursing 
and administering the system implying further control problems. It was de- 
cided that all the eligibility decisions and disbursement of the benefits would 
be administered by the state at the district level. 
Prior to the current system, families were entitled to the whole package 
of family benefits, irrespective of their income. The original draft of the new 
social support system proposed that all the family benefits would be means- 
tested (with the exception of foster-parent care benefits). However, the result- 
ing law passed by Parliament contains both means-tested and non-tested 
benefits. Minimum living standards serve as a basis for the determination of 
both the eligibility for and amount of the family allowance. This way, both 
the levels of the benefits and the eligibility criteria are automatically indexed 
whenever MLS's are changed. 
Social support benefits are paid to all persons residing on the territory of 
the Czech Republic. This means that the permanent residence of a person and 
not his/her nationality is decisive. Hence, foreigners with a long term legal 
residence status are also eligible. 
We now turn to the description of major benefits comprising this system. 
2.2.1 Means-tested family benefits.'7 
i) child allowances - supplementary income for the purpose of raising a child. 
Level o f  benefit: From January 1993 to October 1995, the amount of the 
monthly allowance was only a function of the age of the child, ranging from 
340 CZK (for a child less than six years of age) to 490 C Z K  (for a child over 
15 years of age). 8 Since October 1995, the size of the benefit depends also on 
the household income. Eligibility: Families with income of up to triple the 
MLS for their type of family are eligible for some allowance. If the total in- 
come is less than 1.10*MLS for their family type, the benefit equals 0.32*MLS 
of a child for each dependent child. Families with income in the range of 
1.10-1.80*MLS are eligible for 0.28*MLS of a child for each dependent child. 
Families with income in the range 1.80-3.00*MLS are eligible for 0.14*MLS 
of a child for each dependent child. Entitlement lasts as long as the child is 
dependent. A parent has to re-apply each year and the family income during 
the preceding year is tested. A dependent child is defined as any unmarried 
child under the age of 26 years as long as he/she is a student in a defined type 
of secondary or higher educational institution or cannot (due to a long-term 
sickness or disability) earn any income. A person under the age of 18 who is 
registered as unemployed and not receiving unemployment benefits is con- 
sidered to be a dependent child. (A married person can be a dependent child 
only if that person is married to another dependent child.) 
A family with two children (6 and 12 years of age) and with a net average 
See below for the definition of income for the purpose of means testing. 
8 Before 1993 the allowance was a function of the total number of children in the family, where 
the marginal increment was positive. 
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monthly income in 1994 of 10,647 CZK (= 1.3*MLS in January 1996) was 
eligible for a child allowance of 409 CZK for the younger and 484 CZK for 
the older child. These allowances thus comprised an addition of about 8.4% 
to the net income of this family. The share rises dramatically for the lower 
income households. A household earning 75% of its MLS (6,143 CZK) quali- 
fied at the same period for a total allowance of 1,021 CZK or some 17% of its 
net income. Such a family would also qualify for social assistance since its 
income, even after adding the children allowance, was still below the MLS for 
that family. The additional SA benefit would be 1,027 CZK. 
ii) social allowance when earing for a child - additional supplementary 
income for raising a child. Eligibility: a family with at least one dependent 
child and having an income below 1.6*MLS. Entitlement." the length time 
the family's income is below 1.6*MLS and the child is still a dependent. A 
parent has to re-apply quarterly. The income of the preceding quarter is tested. 
The level o f  the benefit is defined as follows: 
SA = MLS1  
M L S I * I  
MLS2* 1.6 
where: SA = social allowance when caring for a child 
M L S 1  = sum of individual minimum living standards of all dependent 
children 
M L S 2  = minimum living standard of the family (sum of individual 
standards and household minimum) 
I = family income 
The benefit is scaled up further when either the children or the parents are 
sick with a long-term illness or disabled, or when the household is formed by a 
single parent (the scaling coefficients are different for each situation). Hence, 
the family in the previous example for child allowances would be eligible for 
an additional 559 CZK per month for the duration of one quarter. If  the older 
child in this family were sick with a long-term illness, the family would instead 
be eligible for 730 CZK per month. 
iii) benefit to cover housing expenses - Eligibility: A household is eligible 
when the joint income of all persons permanently residing in a fiat falls below 
1.4*MLS for this type of a household, irrespective of the ownership type of 
the flat (also inhabitants of the self-owned fiats are eligible) and irrespective of 
the actual housing expenses. A household has to re-apply quarterly and the 
income of the preceding quarter is tested. The level o f  the benefit for the house 
defined as follows: 
H B  = M L S h  
MLSh*I  
MLS* 1.4 
where: H B  = housing benefit 
M L S h  = household minimum (part of the minimum living standard 
related to the household expenditures) 
M L S  = minimum living standard for the household (sum of individ- 
ual standards and household minimum) 
I = household joint income 
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(iv) benefit to cover transportation expenses - is a benefit introduced after 
the subsidies to pupil and student transport fares were phased out. Any depen- 
dent child studying in a municipality different from his/her permanent resi- 
dence municipality is eligible. Families, where children did not complete 
compulsory schooling (9 years), are eligible for the benefit irrespective of the 
family income. If  a dependent child studies at the secondary or higher educa- 
tional institution, only a family with income below 2.0*MLS is eligible. Con- 
struction of  the benefit level is very detailed and the resulting sum depends on 
the type of  a school attended and regularity of transportation (daily, weekly, 
etc.). Entitlement is established yearly. 
2.2.2 Non-tested fami ly  benefits: 
i) parental allowance - a payment to a parent caring personally full-time for a 
child under the age of  four or a handicapped child under the age of seven.9 
I.e., the child must not be placed in nursery, kindergarten or any other institu- 
tion for pre-school children. A parent is eligible for the benefit if he/she does 
not earn any income and does not receive health insurance or maternity leave 
benefits. The only exceptions are when the net income earned by the parent is 
less than or equal to his/her personal MLS or if the employment contract 
implies no more than two hours of work per day. In 1994 the maximum ben- 
efit was defined as a lump sum and represented 79% of  the minimum wage. 
Currently, the size of  the benefit is defined as 1.1 times the personal MLS of 
the parent. As of  October 1996 the benefit was 2,112 CZK or 84% of  the 
minimum wage. 
ii) benefit at the birth o f  a child - is a one-time benefit provided upon the 
birth of  a child. The size of  the benefit is a multiple of the individual MLS of 
a newly born child (currently 1,410 CZK) and depends on the number of 
children born simultaneously, rising nonlineady. 1~ 
iii) foster care benefits and benefits for  families o f  conscripts - Foster care 
benefits include allowance covering the individual nutrition needs of  a child, 
remuneration for the foster parent, one-time start-up allowance (equivalent to 
the benefit at birth), allowance for buying a motor  vehicle (70% of the price 
with a maximum limit when caring for at least 4 children). Children of mili- 
tary conscripts and their spouses caring for a child below the age of four are 
eligible for the benefit of 0.67*MLS for their respective individual needs. 
iv) lump sum funeral  benefit - is paid to a person that organised a funeral 
and is fixed at 3,000 CZK. 
All of  the social support benefits are non-taxable but are included in the 
income of  a household applying for the income support under the system of 
Social Assistance. 
2.3 Social insurance 
An exhaustive analysis of the Czech social insurance system is obviously be- 
yond the scope of  this paper. Hence, in this section we briefly review the recent 
9 Before 1995:3, the child had to be less than three years old. 
10 The benefit for the birth of a child is 4.0*MLS when one child is born, 5.0*MLS per child when 
two children are born and 9.0*MLS per child when three or more children are born. 
Work incentive and other effects of social assistance and unemployment benefit policy 95 
changes in the system of old-age pensions and maternity-related benefits, in so 
far as they influence the functioning of the labour market. 
2.3.1 Support in maternity 
Maternity benefits - women can receive 28 weeks of maternity leave (37 weeks 
for single mothers) with a benefit equal to 69% of  their gross daily wage for 
the full calendar month (30-31 days). The upper ceiling for the daily wage is 
set at 270 CZK, thus the implied monthly ceiling is at 8,100-8,370 CZK (for 
30 and 31 days, respectively). A woman can therefore receive as much as 
5,589-5,775 CZK in benefits which are non-taxable. This is more than 2.5 
times the minimum wage or 78% of the average wage in 1995. 
Income equalising benefit during pregnancy and maternity - is paid to a 
either pregnant woman or a woman who has delivered a child within the last 
nine months who cannot for the reason of pregnancy or maternity perform 
her original work and is transferred to a different post with lower wage. The 
benefit is equal to the difference between the original wage before her transfer 
to a different post and her wage after the transfer, with the maximum for the 
pre-transfer wage set at 270 CZK daily. 
2.3.2 Pension system and early retirement arrangements 
The current pension system is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis and faces 
problems of  population ageing similar to those in all developed countries with 
pay-as-you-go pension schemes. The government has so far addressed these 
problems by reforming the pay-as-you-go system and by introducing the 
possibility of private pension co-insurance. In January 1996 the new Pension 
Insurance Bill which came into effect changed the retirement age, the condi- 
tions of early retirement and the calculation of the pensions. 
Pension benefit: Under this new system, the old-age pension consists of two 
parts which are both regularly indexed: 
9 a fixed lump sum to which every pensioner is eligible (920 CZK, and as of 
October 1996, 1,060 CZK per month); 
9 a portion related to the pensioner's previous contributions. Simplifying, one 
can say that this portion is equal to 1.5% of the average gross monthly 
salary (currently averaged over the last ten years of work and scaled up 
according to the recent wage inflation) times the number of years that the 
pensioner paid insurance. 1 
During the next ten years the pension for a newly retired will be calculated 
according to both the new and the old rules, the retiree will receive which ever 
is higher. Pensions are not taxed. 
11 The resulting base average monthly salary is also progressively reduced according to a certain 
algorithm by which only a proportion of the salary less than 1 is taken into consideration in higher 
income brackets. 
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If  a person wishes to continue working beyond the retirement age without 
collecting his/her pension, the pension rises by 4% for each year worked 
beyond the retirement age. When a pension is collected simultaneously with 
earnings from a secondary activity, the income earned in these activities 
cannot exceed two times the MLS during the first two years of retirement. The 
penalty is withdrawal of pension benefits. After the two years, there is no limit 
on the income earned simultaneously with collecting a pension. 
The average (net) pension in 1996 was equal to about 44% of the average 
gross wage and about 56% of the average net wage, while in 1989 the respec- 
tive numbers were 50~ and 64%. As with the MLS levels, both parts of the 
pension are regularly indexed whenever the consumer price index has risen by 
5% since the last indexation. In practice, pension indexation exceeds consumer 
price inflation but is lower than the nominal wage growth. (Until now, about 
2[3 of the gap between the two has been closed by the indexation). Gradually, 
the indexation is envisaged to increase the relative importance of the lump- 
sum portion at the expense of the contribution-related portion. The state fi- 
nanced pension system is thus expected to play more and more a solidarity 
role, while the insurance (income replacement) function will be left to private 
co-insurance. 12 
Retirement age: The new Pension Bill is raising the age of retirement incre- 
mentally until the year 2007. For men, the retirement age of 60 years (in 1995) 
is being raised by two months every year. For women the retirement age in 
1995 was between 53 and 57, depending on the number of children raised. 
These ages are being increased every year by four months. Hence, in 2007 the 
retirement age should reach 62 years for men and 57-61 years for women. 
Early retirement: Rather generous regulations concerning early retirement 
were introduced in 1988 and were tightened only at the beginning of 1993. 
The 1988 regulations did not impose minimum unemployment criteria for 
early retirement, nor did they prevent pensioners from combining pensions 
with earnings from secondary activities. The regulations were changed in 1993 
and then again in March 1994. Under the new comprehensive law, people 
who retire early can not work and draw a pension simultaneously. A person 
has to be registered as unemployed in the district Labour Office for at least 
180 days before he/she can retire early. For those who retire less than two 
years before their legal retirement age, the pension benefit is lowered by 1% of 
the base for each 920 day period remaining between the age of retirement and 
the official retirement age. The pension benefit is then recalculated according 
to the general rules when the person reaches the official retirement age. For 
those who retire voluntarily two to three years prior to the official retirement 
age, the 'regular' pension is lowered by 0.6% for each 90 days and its level is 
not changed once the retirement age is reached. No pensions are given to 
those who voluntarily retire more than three years prior to their retirement 
age. 13 
~2 There are currently some 40 private pension funds in the Czech Republic with the total of 1.3 
million people insured (about 25% of the labour force). 
13 An amendment to the Pension Insurance Bill that further relaxes conditions for the early re- 
tirement has been recently passed by the Parliament. 
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3. Relative magnitudes of the benefits and their incentive effects 
The incentive effects of  the passive labour market  policies on labour market  
decisions can be inferred by comparing their magnitudes to the mean wage or 
the minimum wage. 14 As the numbers in Table 2 indicate, the MLS is rela- 
tively high compared to the unemployment benefit. In 1992 a person living 
alone could receive 1,700 C Z K  as social assistance or if unemployed would on 
average receive 1,450 C Z K  as an unemployment benefit. The social assistance 
for large families appear to be higher - a family of four could receive benefits 
equal to between 103% and 118% of the average gross wage in the economy 
and not work. For  low income workers this might be an attractive option. 
The pitfall of  any such comparisons, however, lies in the fact that no bene- 
fits are taxed. The tax code in the Czech Republic is relatively complicated 
and it is not possible to infer the average net wage from the gross wage data 
published by the Czech Statistical Office. A number of  tax deduction allow- 
ances (e.g. children, spouse, transportation expenses, etc.) complicates these 
estimates. Usually, it is assumed that the net wage represents on average 
about  78% of the gross wage. 15 When this rule of  thumb is applied to the data 
in Table 2, the MLS for the four member  household in 1992 becomes 151% of 
the average net wage. 
An important  point drawn for the statistics in Table 2 is that both the un- 
employment  benefit and social assistance benefit have fallen as a proportion of 
the average wage since 1991. The maximum unemployment benefit fell from 
92.4% of the average gross wage in 1991 to 40.4% of the average wage in 1995 
and has risen slightly in the first half on 1996 to 43.8%. The average unem- 
ployment benefit has also declined substantially but most of  it came in 1992. 
Average benefits  were 49.3% of the economy-wide average wage in 1991, 
31.6% in 1992 and bottomed out at 25.2% in 1995. As with the maximum 
benefits, the average level rose in the first half of  1996 to 32.9% of the 
economy-wide average wage. The MLS has also declined, but not to the 
extent that unemployment  benefits have. Their decline has been however more 
steady. The MLS for an individual living alone declined from 37% of the 
average wage in 1992 to 29% in the first half of  1996. The MLS for a family of  
two adults and two children began at 118% of the average wage in 1992 and 
was 90% of the average in the first half of  1996. Hence the overall conclusion 
from the table is that in general passive benefits have eroded v i s a  vis the 
market  wage. Moreover, the value of the unemployment benefits has fallen 
relatively more than the MLS. 
In Table 3 we present data on social support benefits post-reform, in June 
1996. The data indicate that the relatively high level of  income defining eligi- 
bility for the social support benefits (e.g., in the case of the child allowances up 
14 In addition to the minimum wage (which is largely an accounting coefficient for calculating 
the state contributions to the health care and other funds for the unemployed, children and pen- 
sioners), the employment legislation defines the so-called minimum tariffs. These are dependent on 
the tenure of a worker, his education and a type of job and are applied in the firms with no col- 
lective agreement between the trade union and employer on wages. No employee can earn a wage 
lower than the minimum tariff. Depending on the level of education the minimum tariffs for 
persons with no experience currently range between 2,340 and 5,350 CZK. Hence the current 
minimum wage of 2,500 CZK is low in comparison to the minimum tariff. 
15 See for instance Bastyr et al., 1995. 
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Table 3. Expenditures on and the number of recipients of the social support benefits in June 19961 
Type of benefit Total number Total Share of total Average 
of recipients expenditures expenditures benefit 
(thousands) 3 (mil. CZK) 4 (%) (CZK monthly) 
Child allowance 2230 1080 42.6 455 
Social allowance 561 598 23.6 881 
Housing benefit 198 69 2.7 280 
Travel cost benefit 331 97 3.8 236 
Parental allowance 309 615 24.3 1951 
Allowance for 3 3 0.1 n.a. 
families of 
conscripts 
Foster care 8 12 0.5 n.a. 
allowances 2 
Benefit at birth 5 38 1.5 n.a. 
Funeral benefit 5 23 0.9 3000 
Total 3648 2534 100.0 - 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. 
Notes: 
1 Data presented for a particular month rather than for the entire year because a household can 
be recipient of the benefit only for some part of the year due to the means testing. 
2 Foster care allowances represent the aggregate of four different benefits paid to foster parents. 
3 Number of recipients represents households that were eligible since May 1996 and whose eligi- 
bility was established in June 1996. 
4 Total expenditures are actual expenditures on benefits in June, i.e. including the expenditures on 
benefits paid retrospectively to those whose eligibility in previous months was established only in 
June. For this reason we cannot use the data in the table to establish accurately the average benefit 
where it was not available. 
to triple the MLS of the family) results in a large number  of benefit recipients: 
3.6 mi l l ion in  June 1996 or one-third of the populat ion.  Hence, the original 
a im of  targeting benefits pr imari ly towards poorer  families has thus been 
compromised.  The most  widely received benefit (over 2.2 mil l ion recipients) is 
the child allowance. Approximate ly  86% of all the dependent  children in the 
country  received a child allowance in June 1996, of which 47% were eligible 
for the highest level of allowance, 41% were eligible for the middle level and  
12% for the lowest one. Moreover,  one-third of the families with children 
(about  561,000) qualified for the supplementary social allowance. The number  
of children eligible for this al lowance clearly varies during the year whenever 
the MLS ' s  are changed. According to the estimates of the Ministry of Labour  
the share of eligible children receiving these benefits should vary within 70 -  
86% of all children. 
Despite a stable downward  trend in the n u m b e r  of newly born  children 
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since the start of the transition, the number of parents collecting a parental 
allowance rose as a result of the prolonged entitlement to this benefit when the 
cut-off age of the eligible child was raised from 3 to 4 years. While in January 
1996 some 295,000 parents qualified for this benefit, the number rose to 
309,000 by June 1996. This nearly 5% increase can be attributed solely to the 
prolonged entitlement. The average benefit (which is untaxed) represented 
21.4% of the economy-wide average gross monthly wage. The data since the 
beginning of transition suggest that women fall into unemployment dis- 
proportionately and tend to stay unemployed longer than men. The problem 
might be further exacerbated by this incentive for longer career breaks, which 
is likely to be used predominantly by lower-income less-educated women. 
Despite the above-mentioned qualifications, the 1996 reform of the social 
support system was nevertheless a step in the right direction, as it attempted to 
target benefits towards the needy. In 1995, when the reform of the social sup- 
port scheme commenced, the non-tested benefits represented some 76% of the 
total spending on social support. By mid-1996 this share had fallen to 30%. 
The share of social transfers in the total household income changed over time, 
depending on the overall family income. While the share of social transfers 
to average income households with children fell during the last 2 years by 2.4 
percentage points, this share rose by 5.3 percentage points for the low-income 
households with children. For these low-income households social incomes 
(defined to include social assistance, social support, pensions and sickness 
benefits) represent about 40.8% of their total income in 1996. 
Incentive problems related to the UB and SA systems are, however, further 
exacerbated by the fact that the SA benefits do not readily distinguish between 
those who work and receive an income insufficient to finance basic needs and 
those who depend on the state without working. The transition from one sys- 
tem to another often does not entail any loss of income. As our simulations 
presented in Tables 4-6 show, the effect of exhausting the UB eligibility is felt 
only in certain types of households. In the single adult person family type this 
transition affects replacement rate only in the highest income brackets (for 
those initially earning wages above the economy-wide average) 16 Movement 
from the UB to the SA benefits does not affect families with only one working 
spouse under a wide range of assumptions about his income. These families 
experience a sizeable drop in income already when this spouse becomes un- 
employed due to the existence of the upper ceiling on UB and they immedi- 
ately qualify for the SA benefits from the very start of the unemployment 
spell. Only for the two-earner families with children the replacement rate 
falls significantly after the UB eligibility has been exhausted. Overall, the job 
search incentives are thus present primarily after the transition from employ- 
ment to unemployment when a significant income loss is experienced. Re- 
placement rates are highest for low income families with one working spouse 
and for the low-income single adult households. As the unemployed from low- 
income families are subject to greater risk of long-term unemployment, and as 
in the typical Czech household both adults are working if children are above 
the age of 3-4,17 this low UB/SA transition effect may further inhibit job 
search incentives. 
! 6 Note that about 60% of employed earn currently wages below the economy-wide average. 
z ? Until then a non-working parent qualifies for the parental benefit. 
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Table 4. Transition to the social assistance upon exhausting entitlement to unemployment benefits 
(single adult person, 1 member household, November 1996) 
Initial Percent 











source last 3 
months of 
entitlement (CZK) 
UB SA Total 
Replacement Unemployed, 
rate w.r. to UB entitlement 
the initial exhausted, 
net wage, income from SA 
% (CZK) 
1084 1806 2890 
1445 1445 2890 
1807 1083 2890 
2168 722 2890 
2890 0 2890 
43353 0 4335 









rate w.r. to the 









Source: own calculations. 
Notes: 
1 Any person whose total income falls below the minimum living standard is eligible for the social 
assistance benefits. Therefore, a person earning 75% of the MLS and having no other source of 
income would have in reality applied for the SA benefits. Therefore, the effective replacement rate 
for such a person would have been 100%. 
2 We assume that the reported wage is the sole source of income for this household. 
3 4,335 CZK equals 1.5 times the MLS for an adult in a 1 person household and hence represents 
the maximum UB level. 
4 The economy-wide average gross wage in the second quarter of 1996 (latest figure available) 
was 9,119 CZK, the rough estimate of the net wage is thus about 7,100 CZK. 
4. Financing the passive benefit system 
All  social  t ransfers  and  polices are f inanced f rom the general  state budget  with 
the sole except ion  o f  hea l th  care. Nomina l ly ,  these transfers are f inanced by 
the con t r ibu t ions  f rom the wage  bill  which are split  be tween the employers  
and  employees .  Al l  these cont r ibu t ions  become at  present  de facto a pa r t  of  
the state budge t  and  represent  a significant add i t iona l  cost  bu rden  for the 
employers .  The  worke r ' s  compulsory  cont r ibut ions  are 12.5% of  his /her  gross 
wage: 6.5% for social  insurance (pensions), 4.5% for heal th  insurance,  1.1% 
for sickness benefits and  0.4% for emp loymen t  policies. Employers  fur ther  
cont r ibu te  19.5% of  the wage  bill  for social  insurance,  9% for the heal th  in- 
surance,  3.3% for the sickness benefits and  3.2% for employmen t  policies. The  
overal l  bu rden  is thus as high as 47.5% of  the gross wage bill. These high 
m a n d a t o r y  paymen t s  are thought  to affect significantly the compet i t iveness  of  
Czech enterprises.  
The  poss ibi l i ty  o f  separa t ing  the f inancing o f  social  insurance f rom the 
state budge t  has  been widely discussed. Proposa ls  to this effect were advanced  
bo th  by  t r ade  unions  and  by  employers ,  and  were backed  by  several  pol i t ical  
part ies.  The  new coa l i t ion  agreement  signed after  the June 1996 elections to 
the lower  chambe r  o f  the Pa r l i amen t  includes a commi tmen t  by  the coal i t ion  
par tners  to separa te  f inancing o f  the pensions f rom the state budget  into a 
separa te  pens ion  insurance fund. Current ly  the budget  revenue col lected f rom 
the pensions  cont r ibu t ions  exhibits surpluses over  the pension expenses (in 
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1995 estimated at 2 billion CZK) but due to the ageing of the population and 
only a moderate increase in the retirement age, these surpluses are expected to 
vanish in the coming years. Currently, the surpluses are used to finance other 
types of social transfers. 
All of the schemes described in Section 2, and indeed all social programs, 
except the health care, are administered by state bodies whose directors are 
appointed by the minister of labour and social affairs. There are no special 
separate supervisory bodies. All the eligibility decisions and disbursement of 
the social support benefits are administered by the district-level state adminis- 
tration in the case of social support benefits and municipalities in the case of 
social assistance benefits. 
The majority of the expenses related to social assistance are financed from 
the district- (municipality-) level budgets. Part of them is covered by the dis- 
trict authority's revenue and the rest by the lump-sum subsidy from the state 
budget. The actual spending on non-mandatory items (maintenance of social 
care institutions, investments, etc.) is controlled exclusively by the local au- 
thority and the central government has no influence on the way the subsidy 
from the central budget is being spent as long as the spending covers social 
assistance-related expenses. Investment expenditures related to, for instance, 
the construction of institutions caring for the aged and disabled are typically 
covered from the local budgets. Expenditures on social assistance and social 
support benefits are practically fully covered by the central subsidies. Each 
district authority is assigned a special account at the Central Bank, which is 
used for the disbursement of the benefits, and is provided with as much funds 
as is needed to cover the amount of benefits for which the eligibility was 
established. Given these rules, the funding of the programs is essentially open- 
ended without any upper ceiling as far as the social support or social assis- 
tance benefits are concerned. Administrative costs are split between the central 
authority (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs) and the district or municipal 
authorities. 
Part H. Characteristics of the benefit recipients 
In this part of the paper we establish the characteristics of the recipients of 
social assistance benefits and unemployment benefits and address the follow- 
ing questions: To what extent are the two sets of recipients distinguishable 
from each other in terms of demographic characteristics or household com- 
position? If they are identifiable by some observable characteristics, this might 
assist analysts in understanding why these groups are receiving different types 
of benefits and hence help find solutions for getting them off these schemes 
and into work. On the other hand, the characteristics may reflect "self selec- 
tion" resulting from the incentives of the schemes. The second question ad- 
dressed in this section is to what extent these support schemes create incentives 
that prolong unemployment? Do people in the different benefit groups have 
different probabilities for staying unemployed vs. leaving unemployment for a 
job or to exit the labour force? 
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5. Are recipients distinguishable by type of benefit? 
As discussed above, social assistance benefits are determined by the income, 
size and age composition of the members of a household. Hence in order to 
address the question of what distinguishes social assistance recipients from 
others, it is necessary to carry out the analysis at the household level. How- 
ever, since unemployment benefits are given to individuals, analysis of the in- 
centive effects of this program should be carried out for individuals. In this 
section, we gather information on SA and UB recipients from both the exist- 
ing literature on household analysis of social assistance recipients and our own 
analysis at the individual level using Czech Labour Force Survey data. 
5.1 Household analysis 
Data on social assistance recipients are very difficult to obtain. The major 
problem of data collection is that the social assistance registers are not com- 
puterised to the same extent that the unemployment registers of the district 
Labour Offices are. The social assistance registers contain information needed 
to assess the eligibility for a social benefit, hence data on educational attain- 
ment and professional status of a client and other members of a household are 
minimal. Household income is recorded only when a household applies for 
means-tested benefits. Furthermore, there is no - or at best very little - link- 
age between the records kept by the Social Assistance Offices and the district 
Labour Offices. Nation-wide or regional-level data on the structure of social 
assistance recipients are thus practically impossible to obtain in conventional 
ways. In order to be able to analyse the characteristics of the households 
receiving social assistance, the Czech Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
sponsored a study by the Research Institute of Labour and Social Affairs. 
This section presents some fragmentary evidence obtained by the survey 
carried out by this institute in 1993-1995.18 
The major problem of the survey, which is well acknowledged by the 
authors, is the non-random nature of the sample. The survey was carried out 
in only three districts of the country (Mlad~i Boleslav, Louny and Havlickuv 
Brod). These districts have "average" demographic structure (in terms of the 
age and economic activity of the population) and their choice ensured that the 
resulting sample contained respondents from both industrialised and agricul- 
tural districts as well as from districts with average (Havlickuv Brod), below- 
average (Mlad/t Boleslav) and above-average (Louny) unemployment rate. 
These three districts were also selected for the higher quality of their registered 
data. The sample selection ensured that recipients of each type of social assis- 
tance benefits would be evenly represented in the sample. This of course means 
that the recipients of the less common types of benefits were over-represented 
in the sample. The final sample included 1,002 households. Since the aggre- 
gate data on the structure of social assistance recipients are not available, it is 
very difficult to judge the country-wide representatives of this sample. 
The results of the survey shows that families with an unemployed member 
and who are receiving social assistance tend to have a woman (usually the 
is The following text is based on Kucharova and Lhotska (1993), Kucharova and Petrova (1995). 
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wife) registered: about 78 percent of the registered recipients are female. This 
reflects the fact that a woman is typically applying for the benefits on behalf 
of her household. The recipients cannot be distinguished from the rest of the 
population by their age. However, their educational attainment is very low. 
Some 60 percent of  the recipients have completed only primary education (9 
years) and 25 percent have an apprenticeship training, without taking the final 
examination. 
Despite the fact that at the time when the survey was carried out the un- 
employment rate was 3.1 percent in Havlickuv Brod and 7.1 percent in Louny, 
the frequency with which families quoted unemployment as the (main) expla- 
nation for being on welfare benefits was similar in the two districts. One rea- 
son is probably that unemployment per se is not the exclusive cause for falling 
into the social safety net. In 83 percent of the households another factor 
besides an unemployed member was present, the most common secondary 
reasons were: low income of a partner (13 percent), disabled or very old 
member of  a household (13 percent), incomplete family (15 percent). 
There is a subgroup that is very dependent on social assistance. Almost 
one-fifth (18 percent) of the sample had registered more than once for social 
assistance. Within the 'current' registration, 11 percent of  the sample had been 
registered for over two years and another 37 percent had been registered for 
one to two years. One-fifth of the households had two or more members un- 
employed; these households were more than likely totally dependent on social 
assistance. 
About  72 percent of the households with an unemployed member and re- 
ceiving social assistance benefits were simultaneously collecting unemploy- 
ment benefits. The unemployment benefits was a significant portion of total 
household income (31 percent) and it formed on average 54 percent of  the 
social income of the household. These households were generally more depen- 
dent on social assistance and had lower incomes than the average household 
in the sample. Social assistance comprised over half (57 percent) of the 
household income of  the households with an unemployed member and only 
one-third of  the income of all households. The average total household 
income - including social assistance and unemployment benefits - for house- 
holds with an unemployed person was 6,605 CZK whereas the average total 
income for all households receiving social assistance was 7,053 CZK. The 
average per capita income was 1,894 CZK (2,272 CZK respectively). 
5.2 Individual analysis 
5.2.1 Descriptive analysis 
In this section we analyse the characteristics of unemployed individual re- 
ceiving social assistance vs. unemployment benefits using the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) data (as opposed to the administrative data of those registered 
as unemployed in the district Labour Offices). 19 Following the International 
Labour  Office guidelines, we classify an individual as unemployed if he/she is: 
a9 These surveys have been administered by the Czech Statistical Office at quarterly intervals 
since the summer of 1993 and cover approximately 1% of the households in the Czech Republic. 
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Table 7. Distribution of the population aged 15 + years by employment status (percentage) 
First Quarter of: 
1994 1995 1996 
Employed 61.2 - 60.6 - 60.7 - 
Unemployed 2.5 - 2.5 - 2.1 - 
- Registered at DLO (1.56) 100.0 (1.49) 100.0 (1.67) 100.0 
Unemployment Benefit 23.1 19.0 18.4 
Social Assistance Benefit 35.0 41.3 43.4 
No Benefits 41.9 39.7 38.2 
- Not registered at DLO (0.94) - (1.01) - (0.83) - 
Out-of-the L.F. 36.3 100.0 36.9 100.0 37.2 100.0 
students 21.2 22.4 22.4 
women on leave 5.7 5.8 6.5 
old age pensioners 64.9 60.2 58.4 
disability pensioners 4.8 8.6 8.9 
other 3.4 3.0 3.9 
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total 1 8,303 8,360 8,397 
Source: Czech Labor Force Survey, weighted full sample 
Population of age 15+ number in thousands 
a) no t  working in any paid job  during the week prior to the survey week and 
b) seeking work  during the last 4 weeks prior  to the survey and c) ready to 
take a job  within the next two weeks. Naturally,  some port ion o f  these un- 
employed are registered in the district Labour  Office (LO). We begin by pre- 
senting calculations o f  the incidence of  unemployment  in the working age 
popula t ion using the L FS  data  and the IL O definition o f  unemployment .  We 
also show the propor t ions  o f  the unemployed that  are registered and not  reg- 
istered at the district LO. We then show the relative prevalence o f  unemploy-  
ment  benefits (UB) vs. social assistance (SA) among  the unemployed that  are 
registered. 2~ We finish the section with an analysis o f  the demographic  char- 
acteristics o f  each group to learn to what  extent they differ and hence address 
the question: can an individual 's characteristics be used to predict which ben- 
efit group he]she is in? 
Table 7 presents the distribution o f  the working age populat ion (15 years 
and over) by labour  force status in the first quarters o f  1994, 1995 and 1996. It  
shows that  the stock o f  unemployed people represented only between 2.1 and 
2.5 percent o f  the working age populat ion over this period. The shares o f  the 
populat ion that  were employed or  out-of-the labour force remained fairly 
constant  (about 61 and  37 percent, respectively). Thus  the trends which were 
observed over 1990-1993 - declining propor t ion o f  employed and rising pro- 
por t ion out-of-the labour  force - seems to have stabilised in 1994-1996. (See 
O E C D ,  1995, pp. 14-17 for the 1990-1993 figures.) 
As seen in Table 7, the vast majori ty (about two-thirds) o f  the unemployed 
are registered in the district LO in 1994 and 1996. (The propor t ion declined 
2o Although we know that it is possible to receive UB and SA simultaneously, the Labour Force 
Survey question does not allow people to answer that they are receiving more than one type of 
benefit. Hence, a person answers that they are either receiving SA or UB. 
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somewhat 1995.) Of those that were registered, between 18 and 23 percent 
received unemployment benefits, between 35 and 43 percent received SA and 
about 40 percent (38-42 percent) did not receive benefits. With the expansion 
of eligibility for unemployment benefits and the contraction of eligibility for 
social assistance (due to more means testing) in January 1996, one would 
expect there to be a slight redistribution of people toward unemployment 
benefits and away from social assistance in 1996 as compared to 1995 or 1994. 
However, the data in Table 7 do not support this hypothesis. 
The relative shares of registered unemployed by benefits type are affected 
greatly by the duration of the unemployment spell. 21 For those who are un- 
employed for six months or less (short term unemployed) almost one-third are 
receiving UB whereas for the longer term unemployed, only 8 to 14 percent 
are receiving UB. A little more than one-quarter of the shorter term unem- 
ployed are receiving SA whereas among the longer term unemployed this 
share rises to over one-half. The proportion not receiving any benefits is larger 
for the short term unemployed (40-45 percent) than for the longer term un- 
employed (36-38 percent). Not  surprisingly, there is an increase in the pro- 
portion that receive SA as the length of the unemployment spell passes six 
months since UB entitlement is for only six months. However, it is not evident 
why the proportion with no benefits seems to be higher in the first six months. 
We speculate that these are people who have not applied and/or are not eli- 
gible unemployment benefits in their first months of unemployment (because 
they received severance pay, etc.). This group seems to be larger than the 
group that has exhausted UB after six months of unemployment and is not be 
eligible for SA. 
Returning to Table 7, we note that the lion's share of the population that is 
out-of-the labour force is retired (pensioners). In 1990-1993 there was a sub- 
stantial increase in the number of old-age and disability pensioners (131,000 
people) according to the OECD (1995, p. 15). As we noted Section 2.3.2, the 
laws at this time allowed pensioners to work and receive pensions. During this 
period, disability and early retirement were used, in addition to layoffs, as a 
means to reducing the number of employees in firms and providing a safety 
net. In 1994-1996, this trend seems to have been reversed as the stock of 
pensioners decreased by 3,038 persons, either through death or return to the 
labour force. 
5.2.2 Construction of panel data 
In order to learn the extent to which unemployed individuals exhausted their 
unemployment benefits and moved onto social assistance vs. no benefits, we 
constructed panel data for cohorts of the unemployed using the LFS data. 
Since the LFS interviews two-fifths of the households in a given quarter over 
four consecutive quarters, it possible to construct annual panel data for in- 
dividuals in approximately 11,000 households, z2 
2x The authors are grateful to Mr. Jaroslav Kux for pointing out that in the previous version 
of this paper, the missing values referred to unemployed who were not registered in the district 
Labour offices. 
22 The quarters are as follows: 1Q = November-January; 2Q = February-April; 3Q = May- 
July; 4Q = August-October. 
Work incentive and other effects of social assistance and unemployment benefit policy 109 
The analysis in the following two sections is carried out on panel data for 
two cohorts of unemployed: one that entered the LFS sample in the first 
quarter of 1994 (449 individuals) and the other that entered the LFS sample in 
the first quarter of 1995 (512 individuals). We follow these individuals from 
the first quarter until they leave unemployment or until the fourth quarter of  
the year, whichever comes first. Since 68 (64) percent of the 1994 (199 5) cohort 
left unemployment for either employment or out-of-the labour force by the 
end of  the year, it is not surprising that the average number of quarterly obser- 
vations per individual is 3.05 (3.10) in 1994 (1995). 23 
We categorised the number of changes in types of benefits observed among 
these two cohorts. We found that 80.3 percent and 84.5 percent of the respec- 
tive 1994 and 1995 cohort samples did not change benefit or registration status 
over the period we observed their unemployment spell. This includes approxi- 
mately one-third of the sample in each year that was 'not registered' at a dis- 
trict Labour Office. Between 15 and 17 percent changed status once and only 
1 to 2 percent changed status twice. Among those who changed status, the 
most prevalent pattern was movement from receiving social assistance to not 
receiving benefits. 
We were particularly interested in analysing the group that moved from 
unemployment benefits to social assistance. Unfortunately, only 1.4 percent in 
1995 and 4.0 percent in 1994 were observed making this transition. Given the 
small sample size, we concluded that it was not possible to analyse this group 
separately. However we note that if this is representative of the total popula- 
tion, these results imply that a very small percentage of those with unem- 
ployment benefits move on to social assistance benefits in a given year. 
In Table 8, we present the means (and standard deviations) of  selected de- 
mographic and unemployment-related characteristics during the first quarter 
for each of  the two cohorts. The data is stratified by registration status and 
benefit category. Except for the unemployment rate, which is taken from dis- 
trict level administrative data, all of  the characteristics are available from the 
LFS. The means in Table 8 indicate that for both years these four groups are 
not strikingly different. For  example, there are no significant differences be- 
tween the average age and average educational level of the people in these 
four groups. There are some differences in terms of gender and marital status: 
Although married women represent a much higher proportion of the people in 
all categories, they are an even larger share of the individuals in the 'registered 
and receiving no-benefit category' - 48 percent in 1994 and 36 percent in 
1995. 2~ The characteristic that most clearly distinguishes the four categories 
is, obviously, the duration of unemployment. 25 The average unemployed 
person receiving unemployment benefits has unemployment spells of about 4 
months (4.6 in 1994 and 4.3 in 1995) whereas those receiving social assistance 
benefits are unemployed for about 11 months (10 in 1994 and 13 in 1995). 
Clearly if most people begin their unemployment spell receiving unemploy- 
ment benefits, then only the longer term unemployed will receive social assis- 
tance. The mean district unemployment rate does not seem to vary across 
23 We have a minimum of two quarterly observations per person - the first and second quarter of 
each year. If the individual exited in the second quarter, two is the total number of observations 
we have. If he/she exited in the third quarter we have three quarterly observations, etc. 
24 The values in the table are presented as proportions. 
25 Note this includes the mean duration of both completed and censored spells of unemployment. 
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Table 8. Characteristics of cohort samples of unemployment, by benefit category 1 
1994 1995 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Unemployment Benefits Recipients 
Age 29.653 10.108 30.906 10.068 
Education 11.056 1.537 11.531 1.894 
Married men 0.083 0.278 0.109 0.315 
Married women 0.403 0.494 0.328 0.473 
Single women 0.181 0.387 0.281 0.453 
Single men 0.333 0.475 0.281 0.453 
Duration of unemployment 5.063 3.707 4.641 2.616 
Unemployment rate 4.869 1.638 4.406 1.966 
Proportion of dependents 0.271 0.244 0.285 0.254 
of unemployed 0.308 0.179 0.292 0.151 
of retired 0.121 0.197 0.051 0.154 
No. of observations 72 64 
Social Assistance Recipients 
Age 30.875 10.397 33.175 10.673 
Education 10.656 1.420 10.278 1.588 
Married men 0.156 0.365 0.151 0.359 
Married women 0.292 0.457 0.333 0.473 
Single women 0.292 0.457 0.238 0.428 
Single men 0.260 0.441 0.278 0.450 
Duration of unemployment 10.656 8.268 13.429 9.017 
Unemployment rate 4.760 1.905 4.534 1.594 
Proportion of dependents 0.309 0.257 0.304 0.275 
of unemployed 0.306 0.163 0.272 0.172 
of retired 0.106 0.202 0.093 0.201 
No. of observations 96 126 
No-Benefits 
Age 32.752 11.643 35.072 11.853 
Education 10.966 1.814 10.883 1.488 
Married men 0.154 0.362 0.252 0.436 
Married women 0.496 0.502 0.360 0.482 
Single women 0.171 0.378 0.171 0.378 
Single men 0.179 0.385 0.216 0.414 
Duration of unemployment 6.252 6.826 8.752 8.095 
Unemployment rate 4.233 2.029 4.091 1.853 
Proportion of dependents 0.254 0.245 0.259 0.243 
of unemployed 0.283 0.160 0.301 0.188 
of retired 0.100 0.201 0.079 0.188 
No. of observations 117 111 
benefit groups. However,  it is striking that  the non-registered individuals 
tend to live in regions with much  lower unemploymen t  rates (on average) 
than  people with u n e m p l o y m e n t  benefits or social assistance benefits. We 
created three 'household  characteristic '  variables for each individual:  the ratio 
of the n u m b e r  of household  members  who are either dependants  pensioner,  or 
unemployed  to the total  n u m b e r  in the household. Dependants  include chil- 
dren less t han  15 years of age and  spouses that  take stay at home taking care 
of the family. W h a t  is remarkable,  and  consistent with the structure of the 
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1994 1995 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Not-registered at DLO 
Age 33.494 14.487 34.142 14.625 
Education 11.366 2.078 11.256 2.059 
Married men 0.201 0.402 0.199 0.400 
Married women 0.317 0.467 0.308 0.463 
Single women 0.268 0.444 0.185 0.389 
Single men 0.213 0.411 0.308 0.463 
Duration of unemployment 6.366 6.794 7.543 7.588 
Unemployment rate 3.011 2.137 3.226 2.155 
Proportion of dependents 0.303 0.266 0.256 0.282 
of unemployed 0.199 0.194 0.218 0.183 
of retired 0.169 0.298 0.182 0.321 
No. of observations 164 211 
Source: Czech Labor Force Survey 
I Characteristics in the pt Quarter 
Explanation of variables: 
age - in years 
education - in years 
married and single man and women - proportion of sample 
duration of unemployment - in months 
unemployment rate - quarterly district level 
household characteristics - proportion of household 
dependents - students + children + women on maternity 
benefit  system, is tha t  those who do  no t  receive benefits have families with 
fewer dependants ,  fewer unemployed ,  and  fewer ret ired persons.  
W e  proceed  be low to es t imate  mul t inomia l  logits in order  to learn  if  once 
the o ther  character is t ics  are  held constant ,  we can  have a sharper  picture o f  
who  is more  l ikely to receive benefits. 
5.2.3 Logit analysis 
To wha t  extent  do  persona l  and  household  characteris t ics  and  district  l abour  
d e m a n d  de te rmine  whether  an unemployed  person is receiving u n e m p l o y m e n t  
benefits, social  assis tance benefits, or  no benefits? To  address  this quest ion 
we es t imate  a logi t  equa t ion  with da t a  on the first observa t ion  o f  each o f  the 
two cohor ts  o f  unemployed  persons.  The  lef t -hand-side var iable  has  three 
categories:  1) recipient  o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t  benefits, 2) recipient  of  social  
assis tance benefits; 3) non-rec ip ient  o f  any  benefit (which is used as the base). 
As  exp l ana to ry  var iables  we have included: 
9 D e m o g r a p h i c  character is t ics  
age (years), 
age squared,  
educa t ion  (years), 
dummies  for  a combina t i on  of  mar i t a l  status and  sex to yield: mar r i ed  men, 
ma r r i ed  women,  single men  (the base) and  single women,  
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* The duration of unemployment (in months), 
, A demand variable: the quarterly district unemployment rate (in percent) 
. Household characteristics: 
the number of dependants (children under 15 years of age and housewives) 
divided by the number of members in the household, 
the number of unemployed in the household divided by the number of 
members in the household, 
the number of retired/pensioners in the household divided by the number of 
members in the household. 
As is well known, the interpretation of the logit coefficients is not straight 
forward and is best thought of as capturing the relative likelihood of being 
in each state. The marginal impact of a single explanatory variable on the 
probability can have a different sign than the coefficient. Hence in order to aid 
our understanding of the relative impact of various factors, we present the 
estimates of both the coeff• and marginal impacts evaluated at the 
sample mean transition probabilities. 
Tables 9 and 10 provide the means, coefficients and marginals (estimated 
at the means for the continuous variables and at 0-1 for the dummy variables) 
for the 1994 and 1995 multinomial logits predicting which benefit group 
someone is in. Non-recipients have been used as the base comparison group. 
Overall, the coefficients indicate that there are significant differences in the 
characteristics of unemployment benefit recipients and non-recipients and in 
the characteristics of those receiving social assistance versus no benefits. The 
estimated marginals presented in Table 9 suggest that in 1994 and 1995, a 
person is more likely to be an unemployment benefit recipient (compared to a 
non-recipient of any benefits) if he/she is younger (although the impact of age 
is quite small), more educated, single, with shorter unemployment spells and 
living in districts with higher unemployment rates. With regard to the house- 
hold characteristics, in 1994 (but not in 1995) unemployed people in house- 
holds with a higher proportion of dependants and unemployed tended to 
receive unemployment benefits. The proportion of retired members does not 
seem to be a determining factor in either year. In 1995 the only significant 
household characteristic is the proportion of unemployed members and its 
effect is negative on the probability that the individual is receiving unemploy- 
ment benefits. 
The estimates in Table 10 indicate that one is more likely to be a social 
assistance recipients than a non-recipient in 1994 if one is older, less educated, 
has longer unemployment spells, and has proportionately more dependants 
and unemployed members in the household. In 1995 none of the demographic 
characteristics mattered, nor did the duration of unemployment and the 
unemployment rate. The only significant determining factors in 1995 were 
household characteristics: those unemployed in households with proportion- 
ately more unemployed, dependants and retired people having a much higher 
probability of receiving social assistance. 
The base probabilities for each group are presented at the bottom of 
Tables 9 and 10. To find the probability for any group or change in a charac- 
teristic, one simply needs to add the marginals of that group or character- 
istic. For example, the base probability is the probability that a single man 
with average characteristics receives unemployment benefits is 0.260 (0.174) 
in 1994 (1995). The probability that this single man would receive social 
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Table 9. Multinomial logit model of  unemployment benefits recipients vs. registered non- 
recipients 1994 and 1995 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Variable 1994 1995 





Married men 1 
Married women 1 
Single women 1 
Duration 
Unemployment rate 










10,884 0.082 0.0113 
(0.103) 
0.137 -2.233" -0.3154 
(0,725) 
0.404 - t .600" -0.1508 
(0.550) 
0.214 -0.809 -0.1749 
(0.521) 
7.435 -0.059 ~ -0.0190 
(0.032) 
4.571 0.174 b 0.0265 
(0.086) 
0,277 1,639 r 0,1465 
(0,896) 
0.297 2.210 b 0.2054 
(1.089) 








10267 0,250 b 0.0497 
(0.102) 
0.179 -1,376 b -0.1137 
(0,664) 
0,342 -0.539 -0.0237 
(0.512) 
0.223 0.488 0.0648 
(0.483) 
9.836 -0.116" -0.0215 
(0,034) 
4.343 0.2t0 b 0.0218 
(0.097) 
0,283 0,645 -0.0287 
(&878) 
0,287 -0,173 0.0402 
(1,084) 
0,079 -0.767 -0.1827 
(l.181) 
No. of  observations 2 285 301 
Log likelihood -272,86 -269,70 
Data Source." I994 and 1995 quarterly Czech Labor Force Survey, 
NB: The base probability of  being an unemployment benefit recipient is 0.2603 (0A 737) in 1994 
(I995). 
1 Single men are the base. 
2 Sample excludes unemployed not registered at DLO's, 
a Significant at the 1% level. 
Significant at the 5% level. 
~ Significant at the 10% level. 
welfare benefits is 0.406 (0.451) in 1994 (1995). Hence the probability that 
this single man is not receiving any benefits in 1994 (1995) is 0.334 (0.375). 
Single men with mean characteristics (31 years of age, 11 years of educa- 
tion, 4.5 months of unemployment, etc.) are most likely to receive social 
assistance, somewhat likely to have no benefits but they are unlikely to be 
receiving unemployment benefits. We conclude that the personal and/or 
household characteristics of the unemployed, as well as the duration of their 
spell are important determinants of benefit status. The next question we ad- 
dress is whether unemployment benefits or social assistance have negative work 
incentive effects. 
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Table 10. Multinomial logit model of recipients of social welfare vs. registered non-recipients 
1994 and 1995 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Variable 1994 1995 





Married men 1 
Married women 1 
Single women ~ 
Duration 
Unemployment rate 






31.337 0.248 b 0.0037 
(0.116) 
1100.263 -0.004 b 
(0.002) 
10.884 0.042 0.0016 
(0.098) 
0.137 -1.085 ~ -0.0255 
(0.615) 
0.404 -1.489 a -0.1899 
(0.530) 
0.214 0.181 0.1292 
(0.474) 
7.435 0.072 a 0.0237 
(0.023) 
4.571 0.066 -0.0024 
(0.082) 
0.277 1.599 b 0.2125 
(0.805) 
0.297 2.083 b 0.2687 
(I .035) 








10.767 -0.176 r -0.0632 
(0.095) 
0.179 -1.071 b -0.1575 
(0.517) 
0.342 -0.686 -0.1276 
(0.437) 
0.223 0.068 -0.0215 
(0.421) 
9.836 0.062 a 0.0244 
(0.018) 
4.343 0.107 0.0101 
(0.086) 
0.283 1.550 b 0.3331 
(0.721) 
0.287 -0.830 -0.1919 
(0.839) 
0.079 0.927 0.2896 
(0.806) 
No. of observations 2 285 301 
Log likelihood -272.86 -269.70 
Data Source: 1994 and 1995 quarterly Czech Labor Force Survey. 
NB: The base probability of being a social welfare recipient is 0.4061 (0.4505) in 1994 (1995). 
1 Single men are the base. 
2 Sample excludes people with missing values. 
a Significant at the 1% level. 
b Significant at the 5% level. 
r Significant at the 10% level. 
6. Unemployment duration and the probability of exiting unemployment for UB 
vs. SA vs. NB recipients 
In  this  sec t ion  we  d e t e r m i n e  whe the r ,  an  i nd iv idua l  rece iv ing  u n e m p l o y m e n t  
benef i t s  is m o r e  o r  less l ike ly  to  l eave  u n e m p l o y m e n t  t h a n  an  i nd iv idua l  re- 
ce iv ing  soc ia l  ass i s tance  o r  a non- rec ip ien t ,  ceteris paribus. W e  dis t ingu ish  
b e t w e e n  exi ts  to  a j o b  a n d  exits  o u t  o f  the  l a b o u r  force.  
U s i n g  the  en t i re  d a t a  set fo r  the  t w o  c o h o r t s  o f  u n e m p l o y e d  ( inc lud ing  the  
n o n - r e g i s t e r e d  u n e m p l o y e d ) ,  we  beg in  by  ca l cu l a t i ng  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  t ha t  a 
p e r s o n  o b s e r v e d  as u n e m p l o y e d  in the  first q u a r t e r  o f  the  yea r  leaves  u n e m -  
p l o y m e n t  by  the  e n d  o f  the  years  to  e i ther  e m p l o y m e n t  (Pue) or  ou t -o f - the  
l a b o u r  fo rce  (Puo) o r  stays u n e m p l o y e d  (Puu). T h e  f lows ou t  o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t  
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were substantial during these two years: In 1994, a person who was unem- 
ployed in the first quarter had a 0.624 probability of leaving unemployment 
sometimes during the year for either employment (Pu~ = 0.491) or out-of-the 
labour force (Puo = 0.133). Similarly in 1995, the probability of exiting un- 
employment sometime during the year was 0.639 (with eue-~" 0.467 and 
Puo = 0.172). These flows from unemployment to employment were extraor- 
dinary in light of the Pue's for other transitional economies: 0.350 for East 
Germany, (Bellmann et al., 1995), 0.033 for Russia (Foley, 1995) and 0.361 
and 0.354 for Poland (Gora and Lehmann, 1995). This helps explain the lower 
unemployment in the Czech Republic as compared to these countries. 
We also calculated the transition probabilities for the registered unem- 
ployed, by benefit groups for 1994 and 1995. Clearly those who were receiving 
unemployment benefits were more likely than the other two groups to leave 
unemployment for a job sometime during the year, with probabilities of 
0.640 in 1994 and 0.574 in 1995. People receiving social assistance were just 
as likely to stay unemployed as to leave unemployment for a job (with 
Pue = Puu ----0.426) in 1994 however in 1995 they were more likely to stay 
unemployed (Pu, = 0.530) than to exit to employment (Pue = 0.326). Those 
with no benefits were more likely to leave unemployment for a job (with exit 
probabilities of 0.480 and 0.521 in 1994 and 1995, respectively) than to stay 
unemployed or leave the labour force. Hence, the average person receiving 
unemployment benefits and the average person registered and not receiving 
benefits was more likely to leave unemployment for a job whereas the average 
person receiving social assistance was more likely to stay unemployed. 
Do these transition probabilities imply that social assistance is having a 
negative disincentive effect and that unemployment benefits are not? Is it 
the level of the benefits that is having this effect or is it the characteristics of 
the people that are "selected" into these three categories that are driving the 
resulting transition probabilities? Could it be that, on average, the people re- 
ceiving social assistance are less likely to obtain a job than someone receiving 
unemployment benefits because they are less qualified or simply have less 
desirable characteristics for the employer's viewpoint? In order to tease apart 
these two effects, one would need data on the level of benefits in each scheme 
as well as the characteristics of the people. 26 
Unfortunately the LFS does not collect information on the level of benefits 
the individuals or households receive from UB or SA. However, we do know 
from the Tables 1 and 2 that families with more children tend to receive 
relatively higher social assistance benefits. Obviously families with more un- 
employed will tend to receive more unemployment benefits, and perhaps signi- 
ficant social assistance. Finally families with a large number of pensioners will 
tend to receive more pension income than families with a smaller number of 
pensioners. Hence, these household/family variables can be used as proxies for 
the relative level of the UB and SA (and pensioner) benefits among house- 
holds. We can then test the extent to which an unemployed person's demo- 
graphic characteristics vs. his/her household characteristics (proxies for benefit 
26 Inserting a dummy for which benefit category one is in into a hazard model for transition out 
of unemployment would thus not capture the disincentive effect of the benefit since it captures 
both the characteristics of the people in the benefit scheme (selection mechanism) as well as the 
disincentive effect. 
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levels) determine the probability of leaving unemployment for a job (or out of 
the labour force). 
We have shown in Section 5.2.2 that personal and household characteristics 
and the duration of the unemployment spell play an important role in deter- 
mining which benefit scheme a person is on. Hence we can see whether the 
characteristics which determine benefit identity also determine transition prob- 
abilities and hence explain the overall average transition probabilities above. 
We proceed by estimating individual transitions out of unemployment (the 
hazards) with multinomial logits (exits to employment and out-of-the labour 
force) using essentially the same right hand side variables used in the benefit 
function. We have included two higher order terms of duration since hazards 
are sensitive to the specification of duration. 27 
Table 11 provides the means, coefficients and marginals for the exits from 
unemployment to employment for 1994 and 1995 and Table 12 provides the 
same information for exits from unemployment to out-of-the labour force. 
The estimated coefficients for the transition from unemployment to employ- 
ment in Table 11 lead us to conclude that demographic characteristics are not 
a stable determinant of exits from unemployment to employment. Whereas 
age matters in 1994, it does not in 1995. Education is not significant in either 
years and only one marital status-gender variable is important in one year. 
This would suggest that it is not the characteristics of the unemployed people 
that determines whether or not they get a job - i.e., both educated and 
uneducated, young and old, men and women, married or not have similar 
chances of finding employment. What is important is the structure of the 
household: Those with relatively more dependants, unemployed and retired 
persons are less likely to leave unemployment for employment (and more 
likely to remain unemployed). Since these are higher benefit families, it would 
seem that the household income is having an "income effect" on the unem- 
ployed individual. Moreover, since there is a negative duration effect and in- 
dividuals with longer unemployment spells tend to be receiving SA, this could 
lead us to suspect that the level of household SA benefits is having an income 
effect (work disincentive effect) on the unemployed individuals. 
The estimated coefficients and marginals in Table 12 indicate a similar 
finding in that the demographic variables do not play much of a role (except 
for age in 1995) and the duration variables are very important in determining 
the outflows from unemployment to out-of-the labour force. The longer term 
unemployed are less likely to leave the labour force. However, this time, the 
household composition variables are not important. Hence whether or not a 
person is more or less likely to receive SA or UB benefits does not affect the 
probability of exiting the unemployment pool to out-of-the labour force. We 
conclude that none of  the variables that were important for explaining exits to 
a job are important determinants of exits to out-of-the labour force. 
HI. Summary conclusions 
A social safety net must balance income support while still providing sufficient 
incentive to work for those who have a capacity to do so. In this paper we 
27 We tested for specification using the log likelihood ratio test with duration entered up to the 
power of four and found that the specification with duration up to the power of three was best fit 
by the data. 
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Table 11. Multinomial logit model of transitions from registered unemployment to employment 
1994 and 1995 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Variable 1994 1995 






























0.130 -2.480 -0.5080 
(1.146) 
0.400 --1.146 -0.2821 
(0.890) 
0.221 -0.062 -0.0155 
(0.879) 
0.273 -6.258" -1.5430 
(1.774) 
0.171 -18.918 a -4.6027 
(2.818) 
0.114 -9.573" -2.3396 
(2.242) 
4.310 0.034 0.0146 
(o.152) 
12.232 -4.964 a -o.o615 
(0.972) 
221.4o7 0.285 ~ 333.978 
(0.058) 















0.171 -0.081 0.0058 
(1.049) 
0.345 -1.643 c -0.2117 
(0.885) 
0.210 -0.241 -0.0335 
(0.844) 
0.281 -4.802 a -0.6873 
(1.464) 
0.213 -17.431 a -2.3512 
(2.249) 
0.085 -5.043 a 0.6794 
(1.502) 
4.050 0.133 0.0155 
(0.159) 






No. of observations 285 310 
Log likelihood -112.6 - 127.3 
Data Source. 1994 and 1995 quarterly Czech Labor Force Survey. 
Sample transition probability 0.424 (0.167) in 1994 (1995) is calculated for base. 
1 Single men are the base. 
a Significant at the 1%o level. 
b Significant at the 5% level. 
c Significant at the 10% level. 
h a v e  p re sen t ed  the  s t ruc tu re  o f  t he  socia l  safe ty  ne t  a n d  t r ied  to  m e a s u r e  its 
i ncen t ive  effects. 
W e  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  the  u n e m p l o y m e n t  benef i t  sys tem in p l ace  t o d a y  is 
p a r s i m o n i o u s  by  E u r o p e a n  s tandards ,  a l l owing  fo r  six m o n t h s  o f  n o n - t a x e d  
benef i ts  a t  r e p l a c e m e n t  ra tes  o f  60% and  50%, and  a m a x i m u m  benef i t  t ha t  is 
1.8 t imes  the  m i n i m u m  l iv ing  s t a n d a r d  (MLS) .  O n e  w o u l d  surmise  tha t  the  
r ecen t  e x p a n s i o n  o f  e l ig ib i l i ty  cr i ter ia  to inc lude  once  a g a i n  p e o p l e  w h o  h a v e  
w o r k e d  a t  h o m e ,  t a k i n g  ca re  o f  f ami ly  m e m b e r s ,  shou ld  increase  the  n u m b e r s  
reg i s te r ing  fo r  benef i ts  in the  dis t r ic t  L a b o u r  Offices. H o w e v e r ,  as o f  the  
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Table 12. Multinomial logit model of exits from registered unemployment to out-of-the labor 
force 1994 and 1995 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Variable 1994 1995 



















31.719 -0.156 -0.0005 
(0.161) 
1125.572 0.003 1279.906 
(0.002) 
10.874 -0.171 -0.0019 
(0.150) 
0.130 0.458 0.1042 
(0.916) 
0.400 0.131 0.0403 
(0.803) 












221.407 0.167 a 
(0.041) 



















0.171 -0.909 -0.0891 
(0.758) 
0.345 -0.894 -0.0583 
(0.691) 










15.340 -3.279 ~ 
(0.819) 
333.978 0.167 ~ 
(0.041) 
8710.125 -0.003 ~ 
(0.001) 
No. of observations 285 310 






Data Source: 1994 and 1995 quarterly Czech Labor Force Survey. 
Sample transition probability 0.071 (0.085) in 1994 (1995) is calculated for base. 
1 Single men are the base. 
a Significant at the 1% level. 
b Significant at the 5% level. 
Significant at the 10% level. 
m i d d l e  o f  1996, there  has  n o t  b e e n  a vis ible  increase  in  the  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  u n e m -  
p loyed  wi th  u n e m p l o y m e n t  benefi ts  in  the  admin i s t r a t i ve  da ta .  N o r  is there  
a n y  ev idence  in  the  Labour  Force Survey d a t a  of  a n  increase  in  the p r o p o r t i o n  
o f  u n e m p l o y e d  peop le  o n  u n e m p l o y m e n t  benefits .  
O n  the  o the r  h a n d ,  the  s t ruc ture  o f  the social  ass is tance a n d  social  suppo r t  
sys tems - despi te  m a n y  recent  changes  - exhibi ts  m a n y  p r o b l e m a t i c  signs in  
t e rms  o f  the  imp l i e d  incen t ives  for  the  recipients .  The  sys tem has  m o v e d  in  the  
r igh t  d i r ec t ion  b y  i nc r ea s ing  the  n u m b e r  o f  benefi ts  tha t  are m e a n s  tested, b u t  
the  level  a t  w h i c h  the  M L S  is set is re la t ive ly  high,  especial ly  for  famil ies  wi th  
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many children. The MLS for a one member household exceeded the minimum 
wage in 1995 and 1996. The MLS for a family of four (with two children) 
which had exceeded the economy-wide average wage prior to 1995, was 15% 
below the average wage in 1996. The relatively high standard means that a) 
targeting is not as narrow as might be desired; b) social transfers represent 
a non-trivial part of the income for families with children and c) the scheme 
might have a serious work disincentive effect. However, the fact that able 
bodied people are required to register at the unemployment office, and accept 
jobs offered to them, is a mechanism that prevents some free riders. 
In an attempt to improve the financial strength of the pensions system, the 
Pension Insurance Bill, which came into effect January of 1996, has intro- 
duced incentives and regulations for individuals to remain in the labour force 
rather than retire early or even at the statutory retirement age. 
Do the unemployed people receiving unemployment benefits (UB) have 
different characteristics from those receiving social assistance (SA) or no ben- 
efits (NB)? The answer to the question, based on Labour Force Survey data, 
which has its shortcomings, is yes. An unemployed person is more likely to 
receive unemployment benefits (compared to no benefits) if he/she is younger, 
more educated, single, with shorter unemployment spells, living in districts 
with higher unemployment rates, and having a relatively high proportion of 
his/her members in the household be unemployed or dependants. One is more 
likely to be a social assistance recipient than a non-recipient if one is older, 
less educated (only in 1994), has longer unemployment spells, and has pro- 
portionately more dependants and unemployed members in the household. 
Since the SA package is more advantageous for families with many children 
this finding is not too surprising. 
Who are the people most likely to leave unemployment for a job? Our 
logit estimates show that it is not those with relatively more dependants, un- 
employed and retired persons in their households. They are less likely to leave 
unemployment for employment (and more likely to remain unemployed). 
Since these are also the characteristics that increase the probability of receiv- 
ing social assistance and in turn determine how high the benefits are, we may 
conclude that the social safety net is indeed having a disincentive effect. People 
with large families tend to be on SA and staying unemployed for longer spells. 
Appendix: The concept of income for the purpose of means testing 
For the purpose of establishing eligibility for the means-tested social support 
benefits and social assistance benefits, a household is considered as a single 
entity and incomes of all the household members are added together. The 
household is defined as a single person, married or non-married couple (the 
latter under the condition of permanently living together and sharing the 
common household expenses for at least a year), or parents (persons replacing 
them) and dependent children living in a common household. Grandparents 
and other household members, except parents and their children, are not 
included. The only exception is the benefit to cover housing expenses: all 
persons permanently residing in a flat are considered jointly for the purpose of 
means testing without any further conditions. 
The income for the purpose of means testing includes these broad cate- 
gories: 
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9 income f rom any  ac t iv i ty  (both  dependen t  and  self -employment)  which  is 
subject  to the  income  tax, net  o f  this tax  and  general  social  insurance,  hea l th  
insurance  and  con t r ibu t ions  to the state emp loyme n t  pol icy  
9 all  re turns  f rom p r o p e r t y  ( including royal t ies  etc. and  cap i ta l  gains f rom a 
p r o p e r t y  sale) and  cap i ta l  ( including interest  rates), net  of  taxes and general  
social  insurance  
9 sickness benefits  and  pensions  
9 u n e m p l o y m e n t  benefits 
9 when test ing for  the social  assis tance benefits also any welfare benefits (e.g. 
pa ren t a l  a l lowance  
9 o ther  m i n o r  benefits (such as income o f  conscripts,  s tudent  st ipends,  etc.). 
The  d ra f t  pr inciples  o f  the  new Law on Social  Assis tance which are  cur-  
rent ly  discussed by  the gove rnmen t  foresee also p rope r ty  test ing for  deciding 
the el igibi l i ty  for the social  assis tance benefits. I t  has  been p roposed  tha t  bo th  
i m m o v a b l e  and  m o v a b l e  p rope r ty  would  be regarded,  except  for  a cus tomary  
househo ld  equipment .  M o v a b l e  p rope r ty  would  no t  be regarded  dur ing the 
first six months ,  a n d  i m m o v a b l e  p rope r ty  sale or  lease should  no t  lead to the 
loss o f  accep tab le  housing.  In  the current  system, p rope r ty  is not  considered 
for  the pu rpose  o f  means  testing. 
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